feat: Refactor kvstore and vault to use features and logging

- Remove hardcoded dependencies in kvstore Cargo.toml; use features
  instead. This allows for more flexible compilation for different
  targets (native vs. WASM).
- Improve logging in vault crate using the `log` crate. This makes
  debugging easier and provides more informative output during
  execution.  Native tests use `env_logger`, WASM tests use
  `console_log`.
- Update README to reflect new logging best practices.
- Add cfg attributes to native and wasm modules to improve clarity.
- Update traits.rs to specify Send + Sync behavior expectations.
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# Plan: Ensuring Native and WASM Builds Work for the Vault/KVStore System
## Purpose
This document outlines the steps and requirements to guarantee that both native (desktop/server) and WASM (browser) builds of the `vault` and `kvstore` crates work seamlessly, securely, and efficiently.
---
## 1. Architecture Principles
- **Async/Await Everywhere:** All APIs must be async and runtime-agnostic (no Tokio requirement in library code).
- **KVStore Trait:** Use an async trait for storage, with platform-specific implementations (sled for native, IndexedDB/idb for WASM).
- **Conditional Compilation:** Use `#[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]` and `#[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]` to select code and dependencies.
- **No Blocking in WASM:** All I/O and crypto operations must be async and non-blocking in browser builds.
- **WASM-Compatible Crypto:** Only use crypto crates that compile to WASM (e.g., `aes-gcm`, `chacha20poly1305`, `k256`, `rand_core`).
- **Separation of Concerns:** All encryption and password logic resides in `vault`, not `kvstore`.
- **Stateless and Session APIs:** Provide both stateless (context-passing) and session-based APIs in `vault`.
---
## 2. Cargo.toml and Dependency Management
- **Native:**
- `[target.'cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))'.dependencies]`
- `tokio` (with only supported features)
- `sled`
- **WASM:**
- `[target.'cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")'.dependencies]`
- `idb`
- `wasm-bindgen`, `wasm-bindgen-futures`
- **Crypto:**
- Only include crates that are WASM-compatible for both targets.
- **No unconditional `tokio`** in `vault` or `kvstore`.
---
## 3. Code Organization
- **KVStore Trait:**
- Define as async trait (using `async_trait`).
- Implement for sled (native) and idb (WASM), using `#[cfg]`.
- **Vault:**
- All persistence must go through the KVStore trait.
- All cryptography must be WASM-compatible.
- No direct file or blocking I/O in WASM.
- **Runtime:**
- Only use `tokio` in binaries or native-specific code.
- In WASM, use `wasm-bindgen-futures::spawn_local` for async tasks.
---
## 4. Platform-Specific Guidelines
- **Native (Desktop/Server):**
- Use `sled` for storage.
- Use `tokio::task::spawn_blocking` for blocking I/O if needed.
- All async code should work with any runtime.
- **WASM (Browser):**
- Use `idb` crate for IndexedDB storage.
- All code must be non-blocking and compatible with the browser event loop.
- Use `wasm-bindgen` and `wasm-bindgen-futures` for JS interop and async.
- Expose APIs with `#[wasm_bindgen]` for JS usage.
---
## 5. Testing
- **Native:** `cargo test`
- **WASM:** `cargo test --target wasm32-unknown-unknown --release` (or use `wasm-pack test`)
- **Separate tests** for native and WASM backends in `tests/`.
---
## 6. Checklist for Compliance
- [ ] No unconditional `tokio` usage in library code
- [ ] All dependencies are WASM-compatible (where needed)
- [ ] All storage goes through async KVStore trait
- [ ] No blocking I/O or native-only APIs in WASM
- [ ] All cryptography is WASM-compatible
- [ ] Both stateless and session APIs are available in `vault`
- [ ] All APIs are async and runtime-agnostic
- [ ] Native and WASM tests both pass
---
## 7. References
- See `docs/Architecture.md`, `docs/kvstore-vault-architecture.md`, and `docs/vault_impl_plan.md` for architectural background and rationale.
---
By following this plan, the codebase will be robust, portable, and secure on both native and browser platforms, and will adhere to all project architectural guidelines.

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🧱 Vault Crate Architecture
1. VaultStore
Purpose: Central manager for all keyspaces.
Responsibilities:
Maintain metadata about keyspaces.
Provide interfaces to create, load, and manage keyspaces.
Ensure each keyspace is encrypted with its own password.
2. KeySpace
Purpose: Isolated environment containing multiple keypairs.
Responsibilities:
Securely store and manage keypairs.
Provide cryptographic operations like signing and encryption.
Handle encryption/decryption using a password-derived key.
3. KeyPair
Purpose: Represents an individual cryptographic keypair.
Responsibilities:
Perform cryptographic operations such as signing and verification.
Support key export and import functionalities.
4. Symmetric Encryption Module
Purpose: Provides encryption and decryption functionalities.
Responsibilities:
Encrypt and decrypt data using algorithms like ChaCha20Poly1305.
Derive encryption keys from passwords using PBKDF2.
5. SessionManager
Purpose: Manages the active context for cryptographic operations, simplifying API usage.
Responsibilities:
Maintain the currently selected keypair.
Provide simplified methods for cryptographic operations without repeatedly specifying the keypair.
🔐 Security Model
Per-KeySpace Encryption: Each keyspace is encrypted independently using a key derived from its password.
VaultStore Metadata: Stores non-sensitive metadata about keyspaces, such as their names and creation dates. This metadata can be stored in plaintext or encrypted based on security requirements.
🧪 API Design
VaultStore
rust
Copy
Edit
pub struct VaultStore {
// Internal fields
}
impl VaultStore {
pub fn new() -> Self;
pub fn load() -> Result<Self, VaultError>;
pub fn save(&self) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn list_keyspaces(&self) -> Vec<KeyspaceMetadata>;
pub fn create_keyspace(&mut self, name: &str, password: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn delete_keyspace(&mut self, name: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn rename_keyspace(&mut self, old_name: &str, new_name: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn load_keyspace(&self, name: &str, password: &str) -> Result<KeySpace, VaultError>;
}
KeySpace
rust
Copy
Edit
pub struct KeySpace {
// Internal fields
}
impl KeySpace {
pub fn new(name: &str, password: &str) -> Result<Self, VaultError>;
pub fn save(&self) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn list_keypairs(&self) -> Vec<String>;
pub fn create_keypair(&mut self, name: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn delete_keypair(&mut self, name: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn rename_keypair(&mut self, old_name: &str, new_name: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
pub fn get_keypair(&self, name: &str) -> Result<KeyPair, VaultError>;
pub fn sign(&self, keypair_name: &str, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, VaultError>;
pub fn verify(&self, keypair_name: &str, message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> Result<bool, VaultError>;
}
KeyPair
rust
Copy
Edit
pub struct KeyPair {
// Internal fields
}
impl KeyPair {
pub fn new() -> Self;
pub fn from_private_key(private_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, VaultError>;
pub fn public_key(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
pub fn private_key(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
pub fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, VaultError>;
pub fn verify(&self, message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> Result<bool, VaultError>;
}
SessionManager (Optional)
rust
Copy
Edit
pub struct SessionManager {
keyspace: KeySpace,
active_keypair: String,
}
impl SessionManager {
pub fn new(keyspace: KeySpace, keypair_name: &str) -> Result<Self, VaultError>;
pub fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, VaultError>;
pub fn verify(&self, message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> Result<bool, VaultError>;
pub fn switch_keypair(&mut self, keypair_name: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
}
📦 Storage Structure
Copy
Edit
vault_store/
├── metadata.json
└── keyspaces/
├── alice.ksp
├── bob.ksp
└── ...
metadata.json: Contains metadata about each keyspace, such as name and creation date.
keyspaces/: Directory containing encrypted keyspace files.
🔄 Integration with kvstore
Native Environment
Storage Backend: Utilize the local filesystem or a persistent database (e.g., SQLite) for storing VaultStore and KeySpace data.
Usage:
Initialize VaultStore and load existing keyspaces.
Perform cryptographic operations using KeySpace and KeyPair.
Persist changes to disk or database.
Browser Environment (WASM)
Storage Backend: Use browser storage APIs like localStorage or IndexedDB for persisting data.
Usage:
Compile the vault crate to WebAssembly.
Interact with the vault API through JavaScript bindings.
Store and retrieve encrypted keyspaces using browser storage.

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# Vault Implementation Plan
> **Design Principle:**
> **The vault crate will provide both a stateless (context-passing) API and an ergonomic session-based API.**
> This ensures maximum flexibility for both library developers and application builders, supporting both functional and stateful usage patterns.
## 1. Architecture Overview
The `vault` crate is a modular, async, and WASM-compatible cryptographic keystore. It manages an encrypted keyspace (multiple keypairs), provides cryptographic APIs, and persists all data via the `kvstore` trait. The design ensures all sensitive material is encrypted at rest and is portable across native and browser environments.
**Core Components:**
- **Vault:** Main manager for encrypted keyspace and cryptographic operations.
- **KeyPair:** Represents individual asymmetric keypairs (e.g., secp256k1, Ed25519).
- **Symmetric Encryption Module:** Handles encryption/decryption and key derivation.
- **SessionManager (Optional):** Maintains current context (e.g., selected keypair) for user sessions.
- **KVStore:** Async trait for backend-agnostic persistence (sled on native, IndexedDB on WASM).
---
## Using Both Stateless and Session-Based APIs
You can design the vault crate to support both stateless and session-based (stateful) usage patterns. This gives maximum flexibility to both library developers and application builders.
### Stateless API
- All operations require explicit context (unlocked keyspace, keypair, etc.) as arguments.
- No hidden or global state; maximally testable and concurrency-friendly.
- Example:
```rust
let keyspace = vault.unlock_keyspace("personal", b"password").await?;
let signature = keyspace.sign("key1", &msg).await?;
```
### Session Manager API
- Maintains in-memory state of unlocked keyspaces and current selections.
- Provides ergonomic methods for interactive apps (CLI, desktop, browser).
- Example:
```rust
let mut session = SessionManager::new();
session.unlock_keyspace("personal", b"password", &vault)?;
session.select_keypair("key1");
let signature = session.current_keypair().unwrap().sign(&msg)?;
session.logout(); // wipes all secrets from memory
```
### How They Work Together
- The **stateless API** is the core, always available and used internally by the session manager.
- The **session manager** is a thin, optional layer that wraps the stateless API for convenience.
- Applications can choose which pattern fits their needs, or even mix both (e.g., use stateless for background jobs, session manager for user sessions).
### Benefits
- **Flexibility:** Library users can pick the best model for their use case.
- **Security:** Session manager can enforce auto-lock, timeouts, and secure memory wiping.
- **Simplicity:** Stateless API is easy to test and reason about, while session manager improves UX for interactive flows.
### Commitment: Provide Both APIs
- **Both stateless and session-based APIs will be provided in the vault crate.**
- Stateless API: For backend, automation, or library contexts—explicit, functional, and concurrency-friendly.
- Session manager API: For UI/UX-focused applications—ergonomic, stateful, and user-friendly.
---
## 2. Data Model
### VaultMetadata & Keyspace Model
```rust
struct VaultMetadata {
name: String,
keyspaces: Vec<KeyspaceMetadata>,
// ... other vault-level metadata (optionally encrypted)
}
struct KeyspaceMetadata {
name: String,
salt: [u8; 16], // Unique salt for this keyspace
encrypted_blob: Vec<u8>, // All keypairs & secrets, encrypted with keyspace password
// ... other keyspace metadata
}
// The decrypted contents of a keyspace:
struct KeyspaceData {
keypairs: Vec<KeyEntry>,
// ... other keyspace-level metadata
}
struct KeyEntry {
id: String,
key_type: KeyType,
private_key: Vec<u8>, // Only present in memory after decryption
public_key: Vec<u8>,
metadata: Option<KeyMetadata>,
}
enum KeyType {
Secp256k1,
Ed25519,
// ...
}
```
- The vault contains a list of keyspaces, each with its own salt and encrypted blob.
- Each keyspace is unlocked independently using its password and salt.
- Key material is never stored unencrypted; only decrypted in memory after unlocking a keyspace.
---
## 3. API Design (Keyspace Model)
### Vault
```rust
impl<S: KVStore + Send + Sync> Vault<S> {
async fn open(store: S) -> Result<Self, VaultError>;
async fn list_keyspaces(&self) -> Result<Vec<KeyspaceInfo>, VaultError>;
async fn create_keyspace(&mut self, name: &str, password: &[u8]) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
async fn delete_keyspace(&mut self, name: &str) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
async fn unlock_keyspace(&mut self, name: &str, password: &[u8]) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
async fn lock_keyspace(&mut self, name: &str);
// ...
}
```
### Keyspace Management
```rust
impl Keyspace {
fn is_unlocked(&self) -> bool;
fn name(&self) -> &str;
async fn create_key(&mut self, key_type: KeyType, name: &str) -> Result<String, VaultError>;
async fn list_keys(&self) -> Result<Vec<KeyInfo>, VaultError>;
async fn sign(&self, key_id: &str, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, VaultError>;
async fn encrypt(&self, key_id: &str, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Ciphertext, VaultError>;
async fn decrypt(&self, key_id: &str, ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, VaultError>;
async fn change_password(&mut self, old: &[u8], new: &[u8]) -> Result<(), VaultError>;
// ...
}
```
### SessionManager
```rust
impl SessionManager {
fn select_key(&mut self, key_id: &str);
fn current_key(&self) -> Option<&KeyPair>;
}
```
### Symmetric Encryption Module
- Derives a master key from password and salt (e.g., PBKDF2 or scrypt).
- Encrypts/decrypts vault data with AES-GCM or ChaCha20Poly1305.
---
## 4. Implementation Plan
1. **Define Data Structures**
- VaultData, KeyEntry, KeyType, KeyMetadata, etc.
2. **Implement Symmetric Encryption**
- Password-based key derivation (PBKDF2/scrypt)
- AES-GCM or ChaCha20Poly1305 encryption
3. **Vault Logic**
- open, unlock, encrypt/decrypt, manage keypairs
- persist encrypted blob in kvstore
4. **KeyPair Management**
- Generate, import, export, sign, verify
5. **Session Management**
- Track selected key/context
6. **Error Handling**
- VaultError enum for crypto, storage, and logic errors
7. **WASM Interop**
- Use wasm-bindgen to expose async APIs as JS Promises
- Ensure all crypto crates are WASM-compatible
8. **Testing**
- Native and WASM tests for all APIs
---
## Design Decisions: Old Implementation, Current Plan, Open Questions, and Recommendations
| Area | Old Implementation | Current Plan | Decision Left/Open | Recommendation & Rationale |
|------|--------------------|--------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| **KDF** | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 | PBKDF2 or scrypt (WASM-compatible) | Which as default? Both supported? Per-keyspace choice? | **Use scrypt as default** for new keyspaces (stronger against GPU attacks)
| **Symmetric Encryption** | ChaCha20Poly1305 | AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20Poly1305 | Which default? Both supported? Per-keyspace choice? | **ChaCha20Poly1305 recommended** for WASM and cross-platform.
| **Key Types** | secp256k1, Ed25519 | secp256k1, Ed25519 | Add more? Custom key types? | **Keep secp256k1 and Ed25519 as default.** |
| **Metadata Encryption** | Unencrypted vault metadata | Unencrypted keyspace metadata | Option to encrypt metadata? | **Unencrypted vault metadata** for simplicity. |
| **Session Manager Features** | No session manager, manual unlock | Optional session manager | Timeout, auto-lock, secure wipe, multi-user? | **Implement optional session manager with timeout and secure memory wipe**. |
| **Password Change/Recovery** | Manual re-encrypt, no recovery | API for password change | Re-encrypt all? Recovery/MFA? | **Re-encrypt keyspace on password change.** |
| **WASM/Native Crypto** | Native only | WASM-compatible crates | Native-only features? | **Require WASM compatibility for all core features.** |
| **Keyspace Sharing/Export** | Manual export/import, share password | Share keyspace password | Explicit export/import flows? Auditing? | **Add explicit export/import APIs.** Log/audit sharing if privacy is a concern. |
| **Multi-user/Access Control** | Single password per vault | Single password per keyspace | ACL, threshold unlock? | **Single password per keyspace is simplest.** |
| **Metadata/Tagging** | Minimal metadata, no tags | Basic metadata, optional tags | Required/custom tags? Usage stats? | **Support custom tags and creation date** for keyspaces/keys. |
| **Storage Structure** | Single JSON file (vault) | Keyspaces as blobs in vault metadata | Store as separate kvstore records? | **Recommend storing each keyspace as a separate record** in kvstore for easier backup/sync/restore. |
| **Error Handling** | Basic error codes | VaultError enum | Granular or coarse? WASM/JS exposure? | **Define granular error types** and expose user-friendly errors for WASM/JS. |
---
**Legend:**
- **Old Implementation:** What was done in the previous (legacy) design.
- **Current Plan:** What is currently proposed in this implementation plan.
- **Decision Left/Open:** What remains to be finalized or clarified.
- **Recommendation & Rationale:** What is recommended for the new implementation and why, especially if it differs from the old approach.
---
## 5. File/Module Structure (Recommended)
```
vault/
├── src/
│ ├── lib.rs # Vault API and main logic
│ ├── data.rs # Data models: VaultData, KeyEntry, etc.
│ ├── crypto.rs # Symmetric/asymmetric crypto, key derivation
│ ├── session.rs # SessionManager
│ ├── error.rs # VaultError and error handling
│ └── utils.rs # Helpers, serialization, etc.
├── tests/
│ ├── native.rs # Native (sled) tests
│ └── wasm.rs # WASM (IndexedDB) tests
└── ...
```
---
## 6. Cryptography: Crates and Algorithms
**Crates:**
- [`aes-gcm`](https://crates.io/crates/aes-gcm): AES-GCM authenticated encryption (WASM-compatible)
- [`chacha20poly1305`](https://crates.io/crates/chacha20poly1305): ChaCha20Poly1305 authenticated encryption (WASM-compatible)
- [`pbkdf2`](https://crates.io/crates/pbkdf2): Password-based key derivation (WASM-compatible)
- [`scrypt`](https://crates.io/crates/scrypt): Alternative KDF, strong and WASM-compatible
- [`k256`](https://crates.io/crates/k256): secp256k1 ECDSA (Ethereum keys)
- [`ed25519-dalek`](https://crates.io/crates/ed25519-dalek): Ed25519 keypairs
- [`rand_core`](https://crates.io/crates/rand_core): Randomness, WASM-compatible
- [`getrandom`](https://crates.io/crates/getrandom): Platform-agnostic RNG
**Algorithm Choices:**
- **Vault Encryption:**
- AES-256-GCM (default, via `aes-gcm`)
- Optionally ChaCha20Poly1305 (via `chacha20poly1305`)
- **Password Key Derivation:**
- PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (via `pbkdf2`)
- Optionally scrypt (via `scrypt`)
- **Asymmetric Keypairs:**
- secp256k1 (via `k256`) for Ethereum/EVM
- Ed25519 (via `ed25519-dalek`) for general-purpose signatures
- **Randomness:**
- Use `rand_core` and `getrandom` for secure RNG in both native and WASM
**Feature-to-Algorithm Mapping:**
| Feature | Crate(s) | Algorithm(s) |
|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Vault encryption | aes-gcm, chacha20poly1305 | AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20Poly1305 |
| Password KDF | pbkdf2, scrypt | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, scrypt|
| Symmetric encryption | aes-gcm, chacha20poly1305 | AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20Poly1305 |
| secp256k1 keypairs | k256 | secp256k1 ECDSA |
| Ed25519 keypairs | ed25519-dalek | Ed25519 |
| Randomness | rand_core, getrandom | OS RNG |
---
## 7. WASM & Native Considerations
- Use only WASM-compatible crypto crates (`aes-gcm`, `chacha20poly1305`, `k256`, `ed25519-dalek`, etc).
- Use `wasm-bindgen`/`wasm-bindgen-futures` for browser interop.
- Use `tokio::task::spawn_blocking` for blocking crypto on native.
- All APIs are async and runtime-agnostic.
---
## 6. Future Extensions
- Multi-user vaults (multi-password, access control)
- Hardware-backed key storage (YubiKey, WebAuthn)
- Key rotation and auditing
- Pluggable crypto algorithms
- Advanced metadata and tagging
---
## 7. References
- See `docs/Architecture.md` and `docs/kvstore-vault-architecture.md` for high-level design and rationale.
- Crypto patterns inspired by industry best practices (e.g., Wire, Signal, Bitwarden).